Judgment is for God, but the best mistakes to learn by are other people's, and so it is also with sailing.
In this anecdote, the first of a series, we present a real sailing situation which was investigated by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), and some lessons deduced. Can you identify the lessons?
A sailing club was holding its regular summer Wednesday evening race for the keelboat members of its club. That evening, a force 5-6 was anticipated outside the harbour breakwater.
After a short discussion with the race officer to decide on a particular course, the yacht crews prepared their boats to race. Seven boats took part in the race, the majority of which were cruiser/racers.
One of the racers was a distinctly different type of boat. This was an 8m sportsboat, equipped with an asymmetric spinnaker on a retractable bowsprit which enabled it to plane at speeds over 20 knots. The boat did not have an inboard engine fitted but, as required by class rules, did have a small outboard which was stored inside the hull near the mast.
The sportsboat had a crew of six on the evening of the accident. Earlier in the year, the sportsboat had been bought jointly by five of the crew on board. The helmsman was a very experienced and accomplished sailor who had sailed a variety of different craft over many years. The rest of the co-owners had only crewed sailing boats occasionally prior to buying the sportsboat. The sixth member of the crew had been invited along by the helmsman. He was an experienced racing crew, but this was his first time on the sportsboat.
All of the crew were wearing sailing waterproofs. Two of the crew were wearing no personal buoyancy: the helmsman, who had chosen not to wear a lifejacket, and a crewman who had left his lifejacket in his car.
Prior to the race, the crew on the sportsboat completed some practice manoeuvres, including raising and lowering the asymmetric spinnaker.
The race then began and the sportsboat, with the asymmetric spinnaker flying, crossed the starting line on a starboard tack (sails on the port side).
Sometime later, the crew successfully gybed the sportsboat on to a port tack (sails on the starboard side) and set course to pass the end of the breakwater into the open sea. The sailing was exhilarating and everyone on board was enjoying themselves.
Just as the sportsboat cleared the end of the breakwater, the retractable bowsprit pole snapped at the point where it passed through the hull. The boat slowed down and the crew lowered the spinnaker and retrieved the broken bowsprit over the open transom on the starboard side. The helmsman asked if everyone was content to continue racing under the main and jib only, to which they all agreed.
The helmsman then tried to gybe to head for the first racing mark, but could not as the boat was moving too slowly. All of the crew apart from the helmsman were on the starboard side of boat clearing the spinnaker.
After attempting to gybe on two occasions without success, the boat suddenly did gybe and heeled heavily to port. As a result, the helmsman fell overboard from his position on the port quarter.
The crew noticed the helmsman in the water, just as he shouted to them to turn the boat around. The guest crewman took the helm, but was unable to manoeuvre the boat as it had turned bow into wind and was caught 'in irons'. The crew shouted to another yacht that was racing to raise the alarm.
That yacht then started his inboard engine and, leaving his sails to flog, made towards the man in the water. The skipper on this vessel also called the coastguard, and the inshore lifeboat was requested.
Unfortunately, the rescuing yacht missed the man in the water on its first pass.
Meanwhile, on board the sportsboat, another crewman had taken the helm to try and steer the boat towards the casualty, while two crew members stood on the foredeck looking for him.
While steering, the helmsman also tried to unlock his VHF hand-held radio in order to change channels to channel 16, but with only one hand free was unable to do so.
The man in the water was spotted floating facedown 10-12m away. One of the crewmen on the foredeck, who was wearing a buoyancy aid, dived in and started swimming towards the casualty.
The sportsboat then started to make some progress towards the casualty and passed the swimming crewman. As it approached the man in the water, two of the crew grabbed hold of him, but were unable to hold him because the boat was still moving.
One of the crewmen - who was wearing no personal buoyancy - jumped in when he realised he couldn't hold on. He tried to hold on to a line trailing behind the boat, but had to let go. The swimming crewman arrived at about the same time, and took the casualty from the crewman with no personal buoyancy to allow him to swim to the now nearby rescuing yacht and climb out of the water.
The rescuing yacht then managed to come alongside the casualty and crew in the water but, with a freeboard of 0.9m,the crew on board the yacht only managed to hold the unconscious casualty vertically, half out of the water with the aid of a rope.
The lifeboat arrived soon afterwards, the casualty was taken on board and first-aid administered - some 10 minutes after the casualty had fallen in the water. The sportsboat crew, meanwhile, had fitted their outboard on to the stern bracket, but the engine would not start.
The casualty was winched aboard a rescue helicopter and taken to hospital, where he was pronounced dead.
There are four lessons that the Marine Accident Investigation Branch deduced from this scenario. Can you identify the four?
Answers next week...
Sail-World Cruising is grateful to MAIBfor its permission to use these incidents
Wilsons Promontory, VIC
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