Incident No. 9 - To sail or not to sail?



6:02 AM Sat 29 Aug 2009 GMT
'Video still of the yacht after the three crew were washed overboard - photo courtesy of the RAF' .
Judgment is for God, but the best mistakes to learn by are other people's.

In this anecdote, the ninth of a series, we present a real sailing situation which was investigated by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), and SIX lessons deduced. Can you identify the lessons?

(Find the answers at the end of the story)


Three friends in their 60s and 70s joined several yachts from their local sailing club for a summer trip to mainland Europe in a bilge keeled yacht.

The trip was intended to take 3 weeks, with the yacht owner's son joining them at some point. The 11m yacht had been bought new earlier the same year and was described in the owner's manual as "exceeding the minimum requirements
for category "A" offshore". It was therefore suitable for the voyage.

The skipper of the yacht had sailed since his youth and had owned progressively larger yachts during the last 25 years. He had sailed his yacht on several occasions along the English coastline in mixed conditions. The other two original crew
members were experienced sailors, with many years of sailing around the UK coastline and occasional trips to mainland Europe, although one was physically limited in his ability to move quickly around the boat.

The voyage across was uneventful and very enjoyable, with everything going as planned. The skipper's son joined the party of three on board. Planning to return by themselves, they parted company with the other yachts from the sailing club.

Some days later, the yacht arrived at its last port before sailing to the UK. The crew was in no rush to return home and, having read the weather forecast for the area, decided not to sail and to review the weather later on. The following day, the midday shipping forecast predicted winds veering north force 5 to 7, perhaps gale 8 later in the west, becoming cyclonic, 4 in the east.

A further forecast received on a mobile phone predicted winds of maximum force 6, weakening later. The yacht departed port at lunch time, motoring into winds of force 4 to 5 from the west, with no sails set. The crossing was expected to take about 30 hours. Overnight, as the wind decreased slightly, the jib was unfurled to steady the boat
and provide some additional way. The early morning weather forecast the next day gave the forecast wind as increasing to force 7 or gale 8.

During the morning, the weather deteriorated, the wind increased and the yacht crew decided to wear lifejackets on deck and use lifelines when outside of the cockpit. The sea conditions continued to worsen as the wind, now gusting at
40 knots, was against the tide. The waves appeared to the skipper to be "the size of houses". Despite the heavy seas and the conditions being worse than any of the yachtsmen had previously experienced, the yacht seemed to be handling well and the steering remained in autopilot.

As the wind increased, the skipper attempted to contact the coastguard to let them know his position and planned destination. On the third attempt, his call was intercepted by a rig support vessel in the area and relayed to the coastguard.

The coastguard passed the report to the RNLI, who agreed to launch a lifeboat to escort the yacht back to safety. The rig support vessel headed towards the yacht to monitor progress and provide a means of communication until the
lifeboat arrived. Meanwhile, one of the yacht's crew had gone below to change into dry clothes when the vessel was unexpectedly "knocked down", rolling heavily to port. The three crew in the cockpit, including the skipper, were washed overboard.

The skipper, by chance, had his hand-held VHF in his hand, and had sent a brief "Mayday" message before being swamped by a wave. The remaining crewman on board also attempted to send a "Mayday" call, but realised the yacht's VHF set had failed. As the "Mayday" message was incomplete, the rig support vessel was unable to confirm the origin of the call, although the radio direction bearing was similar to the heading on which they were proceeding. Shortly after, the coastguard established with the rig support vessel that they had heard a brief "Mayday" distress
message, so the rescue helicopter was requested.

Of the three crewmen in the water, two were conscious, with their lifejackets inflated, the third was unconscious and his lifejacket had not inflated. One of the survivors managed to manually inflate this lifejacket, but it rode up under the casualty's arms.

The rig support vessel reached the yacht and after several attempts managed to manoeuvre close to the vessel. The rescue helicopter was now also on scene. A call by loud-hailer finally confirmed that there were three crew members in the water. The rig support vessel gave the last known position of the yacht to the rescue helicopter which, seven
minutes later, found the three men in the water and winched them on board. The three men had been in the water for almost an hour.

The unconscious crew member was declared dead on arrival at hospital. The skipper and his son both made full recoveries. The remaining crew member on board the yacht was transferred to the RNLI lifeboat and then transferred to hospital for observation.


Click here for the SIX lessons that the MAIB deduced.

Sail-World Cruising is grateful to MAIB for its permission to use these incidents


To try your hand at the previously published incidents, along with the lessons, click the following links:


Incident No. 1

Incident No. 2

Incident No. 3

Incident No. 4

Incident No. 5

Incident No. 6

Incident No. 7

Incident No- 8




by MAIB/Sail-World Cruising





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