Incident 5:-A bitter 'taste of sailing'- Can you identify the lessons?

by MAIB/Sail-World Cruising

11:33 PM Sat 1 Aug 2009 GMT

'Figure 1. Position of engine control lever (bottom left in picture)' .

Judgment is for God, but the best mistakes to learn by are other people's, or as Southern Ocean sailing hero Pete Goss would say, 'Don't cry over the mistakes, celebrate the lessons.'

In this anecdote, the fifth of a series, we present a real sailing situation which was investigated by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), and some lessons deduced. Can you identify the lessons?

(Find the answers at the end of the story)

Nine people from a social and adventure activities group booked a 1-day 'sailing taster', suitable for novices, which was to provide the opportunity to act as crew.

An IMX 38 yacht was designated for the trip. It was certified to carry up to 10 people in Category 2 waters (up to 60 miles from a safe haven). Regulations required it to be manned by the skipper and one other designated crew determined to be 'one other person on board deemed experienced by the skipper'.

The operating company had conducted some risk assessments, but none specific for operating with a totally inexperienced crew.

The group arrived at the marina at 0830, full of expectations. For most, this would be a new experience and they were looking forward to testing their sea legs.

Things did not go well from the outset. There was no one to meet and greet the group. The nominated vessel had been changed, but the group were not told this. When they eventually found the yacht, the nominated skipper said that
he was unwell and was waiting for the replacement skipper (who was also the director of the company) to arrive.

To make matters worse, the boat had been out of the water for 8 months and little had been done to prepare it: the yacht was dirty, both below and between decks; ropes were tangled, some were covered in algae and the locking cleats did not work properly; the deck was slimy; and the impression was, that the yacht had been uncared for and very poorly prepared.

The replacement skipper arrived at about 0920. He agreed that the unwell skipper could remain on board in his bunk during the trip. The skipper then introduced himself and was advised that there was a Day Skipper qualified person among the group, but he was unaware of the group's experience prior to this.

A superficial safety briefing followed. The skipper emphasised the need to keep low under the boom and that the lifelines were to be always clipped onto the jacklines. Contrary to the Company's Safety Policy, there was no mention of the use of liferafts, flares, radio operation or how to start the engine, and the Day Skipper found the VHF radio to be switched off. At this point, some of the group were on the point of leaving, but they decided to see the day out; after all, they were due back alongside at 1700.

There were further delays as the mainsail and genoa were rigged. Fuel and water were then loaded before the yacht finally left the pontoon at 1130 - 2 and 1/2 hours behind schedule. The group were disgruntled, but at least they were on their way.

Once into the wide channel, the group were more relaxed and they settled down to the business of sailing. The Day Skipper was by now on the wheel, with his safety harness clipped onto the rod backstay. A light lunch was made, and at
1350 the yacht came about and made a straight run back down the channel.

The wind was from the WNW at force 6-7 and the yacht was making between 7-8 knots over the ground. As the yacht was heeling to port, the skipper instructed three of the group to sit on the high side to try to bring the vessel onto an even keel. Being inexperienced they felt uneasy about this.

As the yacht approached the channel entrance, the weather had worsened. It began to rain, the wind was gusting force 8 and there were white horses on the wave tops - the group were obviously unsettled. The skipper suddenly decided
to return to the marina and, with that, things immediately took a dramatic turn for the worse.

Figure 2. Day skipper's leg position in the traveller - .. .

At 1426 the yacht was tacked back up the channel. The skipper then asked the Day Skipper to start the engine. The
Day Skipper unclipped his safety line as he prepared to check that the engine control was in neutral, but he found the lever to be seized (Figure 1). He spent the next 2 minutes releasing it; he then moved in front of the wheel to go down below to start the engine, but he was brought to an abrupt halt. His foot became entangled in the traveller because his safety line became taut (Figure 2). His line had not been released as first thought. The skipper, now distracted, turned
round to release the safety line and, at the same time, the yacht conducted an inadvertent gybe.

The boom moved rapidly from starboard to port, trapping the Day Skipper's leg with the mainsheet, causing multiple fractures to his right leg. The boom immediately returned to the starboard side. The Day Skipper clambered to the forward part of the cockpit. At the same time, another of the group, with the help of the unwell skipper, managed to start the engine.

Figure 3. Key accident points showing in the GPS chart - .. .

At about 1432, as the tension increased, the skipper mentioned the need to lower the mainsail, but he did not direct his instruction to anyone in particular. The lady operating the traveller stood up, possibly to help with the sail, and at the same time the yacht conducted its second inadvertent gybe. The boom moved rapidly from starboard to port, hitting the lady on the right side of her head, causing her severe injuries and forcing her partially overboard.

The skipper and two of the group pulled her back inboard. Bleeding profusely from her ears, nose and mouth, her situation was potentially life threatening. The skipper now busied himself in trying to get the sail down. A GPS track
identifying the accident points is at Figure 3.

The injured lady was then attended by the group. They kept her airways clear, but it was a further five minutes before a VHF 'Pan Pan' call was transmitted to the coastguard. The yacht then motored to a nearby jetty where the emergency services attended to the casualties.

Click here for the answers.

Sail-World Cruising is grateful to MAIB for its permission to use these incidents